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The North Carolina "Canary" Rule-Protection for an
Endangered Species?
For a forty-three day period beginning July 14, 1983, the North Carolina
statute that allows criminal defendants discovery of their past oral statements'
was among the most liberal of such statutes in the United States. The statute
allowed defendants discovery of all of their past statements, regardless of to
whom they were made, and seemed to require prosecutors to make a "diligent
search" for all such statements. Many North Carolina district attorneys be-
lieved that the statute was too liberal and would be harmful to law enforce-
ment efforts. They feared that it would impose a tremendous paperwork
burden and would have a detrimental effect on the use of confidential infor-
mants.2 Because of these concerns, the North Carolina General Assembly met
in a special session on August 26, 1983, and amended the statute.3 Although
this amendment limited the scope of discovery, criminal defendants in North
Carolina remain in a better position than they were prior to 1983. The
amended statute balances the defendants' interests in expansive discovery with
the State's interests in less burdensome procedures and the use of confidential
informants. This note considers the concerns that prompted the General As-
sembly to limit discovery of defendants' past statements and concludes that,
although many of these concerns are supported weakly, the amended statute
represents an effective compromise.
By liberalizing defense discovery the legislature probably hoped to make
trial" 'less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.' "4 Allowing a de-
fendant to discover his past oral statements that are known to the prosecution
is supported on the ground that "it is especially helpful to defense counsel in
preparing for trial or in determining whether a guilty plea is advisable. ' 5
Prior to 1983, a North Carolina defendant's right to discovery of such state-
1. Act of July 14, 1983, ch. 759, § 3, 5 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 39, amended by Act of
Aug. 26, 1983 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b) (1983)).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 18-28.
3. Act of Aug. 26, 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
4. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1147 (5th ed.
1980) (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)) [hereinafter cited
as Y. KAMISAR].
5. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 1155. The American Bar Association Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice identifies as one of its "General Principles" that "procedure prior to trial should:...
[p]rovide the accused with sufficient information to make an informed plea." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1l-1.1(a)(ii) (1978). In its comments, the ABA notes,
[A] defendant who is ill-informed about the circumstances of the case may make judg-
ments that are costly to the individual as well as the system. An overly optimistic view of
the circumstances may lead to a wasteful trial, while an unduly pessimistic view of the
circumstances may lead to a premature plea which is subsequently challenged. The fi-
nality of guilty pleas is particularly important when a substantial majority of all cases are
resolved by plea.
Id. § 11 commentary at 11. In its comments regarding the principle that pretrial procedures
should "permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise at trial," the drafters note
that "preparation is essential to proper conduct at trial. . . . [T]he realist knows that effective-
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ments was governed by the limiting language of North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 15A-903(a)(2). 6 Section 15A-903(a) provided that:
Upon motion of a defendant, the court must order the prosecutor:
(2) To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral
statement made by the defendant which the State intends to offer in
evidence at trial.7
Disclosure of the substance of the defendant's oral statements that the prose-
cutor intended to use at trial was mandatory. An additional limitation im-
posed by the judiciary restricted mandatory disclosure to statements that had
been made to a person acting on behalf of the State.8 Both these limitations
were modeled on rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
model for the more restrictive discovery statutes in the United States.9
In July of 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly significantly broad-
ened the scope of mandatory disclosure by amending the statute to eliminate
both limitations. Amended section 15A-903(a)(2) required the prosecutor:
To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral
statement made by the defendant, regardless of to whom the state-
ment was made, within the possession, custody, or control of the
State, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due dili-
gence may become known to the prosecutor.10
Thus, the July amendment removed the "intended for use at trial" limitation
and specifically removed from the coverage of the statute any limitation to
statements made to persons acting on behalf of the State. t l Those who fa-
vored the amendment stated that it ensured that "all the cards are on the ta-
ble"12 during trial, and gave "the defendant the opportunity to know what he
is dealing with."' 3 These proponents noted that the defendant would no
longer "be confronted by nameless accusers. ' 14
ness at trial depends upon meticulous evaluation and preparation of the evidence to be presented
at trial. Id.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1983), amended by Act of Aug. 26, 1983. North Caro-
lina has recognized that "no right to pretrial discovery existed at common law." State v. Hardy,
293 N.C. 105, 124, 235 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1977). Instead, a defendant's right to discovery in North
Carolina is governed by Article 48 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes. Section 15A-903(a)
governs discovery of statements made by the defendant; subdivision I governs written or recorded
statements. Subdivision 2, with which this note is concerned, covers oral statements.
7. N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (1983).
8. See State v. Mills, 307 N.C. 504, 299 S.E.2d 203 (1983).
9. See id. at 509, 299 S.E.2d at 206; State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 619, 252 S.E.2d 745, 753-
54 (1979). Federal rule 16 limits discovery of a defendant's oral statements to those intended to be
used at trial and those made "in response to interrogation by any person then known to be a
government agent." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
10. Act of July 14, 1983, ch. 759, § 3, 5 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 39, amended by Act of
Aug. 26, 1983. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b) (1983)).
I1. See id.
12. Interview with Alan D. Briggs, Lobbyist for the N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers, quoted
in Raleigh News and Observer, July 29, 1983, at ID, col. 3.
13. Interview with Rep. Allen Adams, D-Wake, quotedin Raleigh News and Observer, July




The July amendment made North Carolina one of the more liberal juris-
dictions under this category of defense discovery. The North Carolina statute
no longer resembled federal rule 16, but came closer in form to the American
Bar Association Standards, 15 the primary model for many of this country's
most liberal discovery statutes. 16
Although proponents of liberal discovery supported this change, many
North Carolina district attorneys disagreed. The district attorneys contended
that the amended statute would harm law enforcement efforts. They argued
against the statute, asserting two criticisms that traditionally are directed at
broad discovery: first, the statute's vague and undefined boundaries would
increase the prosecutor's paperwork burden; and second, the statute would
lead to harassment of informants.17 The argument that the broadened scope
of the prosecutor's duty would greatly increase their paperwork burdens' 8 was
based on the requirement that the prosecutor disclose to the defendant all
statements made by the defendant to any person, regardless of whether that
person would be testifying at trial. The limits of this duty were marked by
vague and undefined boundaries. The prosecutor was to disclose all such
statements "within the possession, custody, or control of the State" that are
"known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to" the prose-
cutor. 19 The statute did not indicate whether the prosecutor's duty was limited
15. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11-2.11 (1978) provides for open fie discovery.
16. "By 1975, twenty-two states had substantially implemented the ABA standards through
judicial or legislative action." Id. § 11-1.1 commentary at 11.8, n.3 (citing Robinson, The AB.4
Standardsfor Criminal Justice: What They Mean To The Criminal Defense 4ttorney, 1 NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEF. 3 (1975)); see generally Y. KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 1155.
17. See infra note 24.
18. See L. WATTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE PRETRIAL
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3 OF CHAPTER 759 (HousE BILL 1143), SESSION
LAWS OF 1983 7 (Aug. 24, 1983) (Mr. Watts is Assistant Director, The Institute of Government,
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.). The report concluded that "paperwork is the
most important single factor in the acceptance or rejection of any new procedure." Id. at 12. See
also M. EASLEY, INTERVIEWS WITH FLORIDA STATE'S ATTORNEYS AND FLORIDA LAW ENFORCE-
MENT OFFICERS (Aug. 23, 1983) (Easley is the District Attorney for the 13th Judicial District of
North Carolina.). Easley's report placed great emphasis on the greatly increased time and expense
burdens.
The ABA Standards recognize that pretrial procedures should "effect economies in time,
money, judicial resources, and professional skills by minimizing paperwork." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § I 1-1.1(vi) (1978). Although the ABA Standards provide for broad, liberal-
ized discovery, the policy of minimizing paperwork is accomplished by allowing "open file" dis-
covery-the prosecutor's files are open to the defendant. This minimizes the prosecutor's burden.
Because the North Carolina statute denies discovery for much information, such as the names of
witnesses, and witness statements, see supra text accompanying note 8, disclosure must be accom-
plished by defining the prosecutor's duty.
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Since one does not ordinarily use the language "possession, custody, or control," when
speaking of things that do not have physical existence (such as oral statements), it is not
possible to predict with reasonable certainty how this limitation will be interpreted ....
It is unclear whether oral statements known to non-law-enforcement potential State's
witnesses are included within "possession, custody, or control," but once anyone investi-
gating or prosecuting the case learns of it, the State would seem to have possession,
custody, or control .... [T]he statute places a further limitation based on the knowl-
edge of the prosecutor in the case. He must know of the statement or be able to know of
it through the exercise of due diligence. This raises an issue whether a discovery request
by a defendant requires a prosecutor to begin a diligent search for any oral statements.
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to disclosure of statements that were relevant to the offense charged, or
whether there was a limitation with respect to the time when the statement was
made.20 Thus, the new statute arguably expanded the prosecutor's duty far
beyond his own trial preparation to require a "diligent search" 21 for any oral
statements made by the defendant. The statute created an expensive, time-
consuming paperwork burden for the State.
The paperwork argument, though important for the policy of effecting
economies in the discovery process,22 was not the pivotal reason for the
amendment by the North Carolina General Assembly. The needlessly vague
and overreaching aspects of the statute could be changed easily and without-
controversy to appease the district attorneys.2 3 The district attorney's second
argument-that the Act would lead to harassment of confidential infor-
mants-goes to the heart of the broad-versus-limited discovery argument and
was the focal point of the controversy that led to the second amendment in
August 1983.24
The district attorneys contended that the July amendment would lead to
the disclosure of the identities of confidential informants, 25 and that such dis-
closure would give rise to threats, and, in many cases, harm to informants.
Although the July amendment did not order specifically the disclosure of the
The likelihood, however, is that the prosecutor-with his continuing duty to disclose
under G.S. 15A-907-must, at a minimum, disclose oral statements when he learns of
them.
K. CANNADAY, MEMORANDUM TO REPRESENTATIVE ALLEN ADAMS 2 (Aug. 11, 1983) (Carnaday
is Assistant Director, The Institute of Government, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.)
20. [M]ust the statement have some apparent relevance to the crime charged to be dis-
coverable? No such limitation is explicitly contained in G.S. 15A-903(a)(2) as amended.
Probably some apparent relevance is required. The question of whether that relevance
was "apparent" would be for ad hoc determination in a hearing conducted in the ab-
sence of the jury. This issue did not arise under the old law since all statements intended
for use at trial have apparent relevance.
Second, is there a limitation with respect to the time when the statement was made?
Under the old law, this issue did not arise, since discovery was limited to statements
made to persons acting on behalf of the State, which normally occur during the investi-
gation of the alleged crime. This is in accord with the use of the word "statement"
which, especially in the context of litigation, normally refers to formal declarations, re-
ports, or narratives. However, "statement" can also mean a single declaration or remark.
Thus, the new law may be interpreted to mean that the prosecutor must reduce to written
or recorded form everything said by the defendant during the commission of the alleged
offense, as well as anything relevant that he said before or afterward, no matter how
voluminous this material may be.
K. CANNADAY, supra note 19, at 2-3.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See supra note 18.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
24. According to newspaper reports, the concern that led to the August amendment was the
protection of confidential informants. See Raleigh News and Observer, July 16, 1983, at IC, col.
5; id. July 29, 1983, at ID, col. 3; id. July 30, 1983, at IA, col. 6; id. Aug. 5, 1983, at IA, col. 1; Id.
Aug. 13, 1983, at IA, col. 1; id. Aug. 16, 1983, at IA, col. 5; id. Aug. 21, 1983, at 29A, col. 3; Id.
Aug. 23, 1983, at IA, col. 1; id. Aug. 25, 1983, at IA, col. I.
25. North Carolina recognizes the privilege to withhold the identity of informants in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-978(b) (1983). See also State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E.2d 476 (1957). This
privilege is constitutional, at least as long as the issue is the lawfulness of the arrest. Rugendorf v.
United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
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identities of prosecution informants, as do the statutes of the most liberal dis-
covery jurisdictions,2 6 opponents argued that a defendant who learned the in-
criminating statements from the prosecutor, as required by the July
amendment, often would be able to determine the identity of the informants. z7
At a minimum, opponents argued that the possibility of exposure of the identi-
ties of informants and the resulting reluctance of informants to come forward
would have a "chilling effect" on the use of this important prosecution
device.2 8
Proponents countered by arguing that this "chilling effect" would not re-
sult because district attorneys under existing state law would be able to obtain
protective orders to shield informants.z 9 Prosecutors, however, argued that
protective orders do not guarantee satisfactorily informant anonymity. What
a prosecutor might consider to be good cause for a protective order might not
satisfy the judge who issues the orders. Thus, policemen and prosecutors
would not be certain whether they could obtain a protective order. Without
such guarantees most informants likely would not come forward.30
These witness harassment arguments are speculative.3 1 The evidence
presented to the legislative committee that examined the difficulties exper-
ienced by other states in implementing similar statutes demonstrates that, with
the possible exception of Florida, no state has had any difficulty with witness
harassment. 32 A report on Florida's witness harassment experience was the
26. See Y. KAMISAR, supra note 4, at 1158.
27. Raleigh News and Observer, July 29, 1983, at ID, col. 3.
28. Id., Aug. 16, 1983, at IA, col. 5.
29. Id. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908 (1983); infra text accompanying note 55.
30. Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1983, at IA, col. 6; id. Aug. 13, 1983, at IA, col. 1.
31. The ABA finds such arguments unconvincing:
Some of the traditional reasons for denying or restricting discovery have been the fear
that pretrial disclosure will subject victims and witnesses to threats or other abuse ...
However, experience with broad discovery suggests that discovery does not pose such
problems in the majority of cases and that protective orders are an appropriate method
of coping with the occasional case in which pretrial disclosure will jeopardize victims,
witnesses, or evidence.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 11 commentary at 11.16-.17.
32. See M. EASLEY, supra note 18; L. WATTS, supra note 18. The difficulty of making com-
parisons with other states was recognized in the L. WArrs report:
Other states usually enacted broad discovery as a package, and the respondents from
other states had difficulty in focusing upon the problems specifically caused by the por-
tion on oral statements of defendants.
Most of the sixteen states surveyed require the provision of witness lists to defend-
ants, and in many instances the statements of those witnesses. Thus a major criticism
made here that furnishing the oral statements of defendants made to third parties will
reveal the identity of those parties has no force in those states. Many other jurisdictions
have specific provisions for keeping the identity of confidential informants secret, in the
absence of constitutional prejudice to the defendant. In some states the privilege is in the
section concerning what need not be disclosed along with the work-product exception; in
others the maintenance of confidentiality as to an informer's identity is specifically a
factor to be considered by the judge in fashioning protective orders. The most pervasive
problem of comparability, though, arises from the fundamentally different way that
prosecutors screen and prepare cases in the other jurisdictions contacted and contrasted
with the way the majority of North Carolina prosecutors do.
L. WATTS, supra note 18, at 8.
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instrumental factor in prompting the August amendment of the North Caro-
lina statute.33 To evaluate the effect of the August amendment, an analysis of
the Florida experience is necessary.
Initially, it must be emphasized that any comparison between Florida's
discovery laws and the July amendment to section 15A-903(a)(2) is critically
suspect. The Florida law specifically requires the disclosure, prior to trial, of
the names and addresses of all people whom the prosecutor believes have in-
formation concerning the case.34 Furthermore, it allows the defendant to see
the statements of informants. 35 Under North Carolina's July amendment,
however, informants who did not offer prior statements of the defendant re-
mained anonymous. Defendants were not entitled to see the exact statements
or know the identity of the source. Therefore, Florida law differs substantially
from the North Carolina law in a way that makes witness harassment consid-
erably more likely under the former's version.
Although both states have protective order provisions to deny discovery
when necessary to protect informants, 36 the effectiveness of such orders on an
informant's willingness to come forward depends on the informant's certainty
that the order will be issued.37 Because Florida's discovery statute is much
broader than the July amendment, there is a much greater risk to informants,
and much less certainty about the effectiveness of protective orders. Thus, it
does not follow that the July amendment would have caused any of the Flor-
ida witness harassment problems or the "chilling effect" on use of informants.
Although the Florida statute is distinguishable from the July amendment,
Florida's experience contributed significantly to the North Carolina General
Assembly's decision to amend the statute. It appears that the General Assem-
bly was impressed by the similarity between both states' experience with drug
trafficking, and the large amount of drug-related deaths in Florida that are
connected with witness harassment. 3s Interestingly, the evidence presented to
33. Act of Aug. 26, 1983.
34. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
35. Id., which states in part:
(a) Prosecutor's Obligation.
(1) After the filing of the indictment or information, within fifteen days after written
demand by the defendant, the prosecutor shall disclose to defense counsel and permit
him to inspect, copy, test and photograph, the following information and material within
the State's possession or control:
(i) The names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor to have infor-
mation which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense with respect
thereto.
(ii) The statement of any person whose name is furnished in compliance with the
preceding paragraph....
36. See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908 (1983). In Florida, the "general rule is that the State
has the privilege of nondisclosure of the identity of a confidential informant and the burden is on
the defendant to show why disclosure should be compelled." Elkins v. State, 388 So. 2d 1314,
1315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
37. This conclusion follows from the argument of the North Carolina district attorneys who
feared a "chilling effect" on the use of confidential informants. See supra text accompanying note
30.
38. See infra note 42.
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the General Assembly demonstrates that Florida's problems with witness har-
assment are not widespread,39 but apparently confined to a single county. In
his report to the General Assembly,40 Michael F. Easely, a North Carolina
district attorney, noted that drug-related homicides were the second-highest
category of murders in Dade County during 1981 and 1982.4 1 He also noted
that Florida's discovery law, which requires disclosure of the names of wit-
nesses, "contributed heavily to the drug-related murders." 42
The North Carolina General Assembly was concerned with the possibility
of a similar increase in drug-related homicides as a result of the July amend-
ment. The North Carolina district attorneys who were most unhappy with the
July amendment were those in the coastal counties where, because of the "ex-
tensive coastline and expansive rural areas," drug smuggling is "rampant."
43
It was argued that under the liberal discovery provision of the July amend-
ment, "[a]n attempt by the state, under those circumstances, to continue to
aggressively prosecute all drug trafficking cases would be irresponsible. It
would result in intimidation, serious bodily injury and death of potential state
witnesses." 44 The district attorneys argued that in drug-related cases, "crimi-
nal penalties are stiff and defendants go to great lengths to avoid convic-
tion.' 45 Thus, because of organized crime's involvement in drug trafficking,
4 6
there would be a dangerous likelihood of harassment and harm to informants
if their identity could be ascertained from the disclosures required by the July
amendment. The General Assembly apparently was persuaded.
In response to the issues raised by the liberalized discovery statute the
39. See, e.g., Raleigh News and Observer, Aug. 21, 1983, at 29A, col. 3 (quoting Steve Mas-
terson, Executive Director, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers):
Masterson said his state has no problems prosecuting criminal cases while operating
under a far more liberal disclosure rule than North Carolina's law officers are fight-
ing....
When informants do need to be kept confidential, Florida's rules permit statements
and identities to be withheld from the defendant if "there is a substantial risk to any
person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals or unnecessary an-
noyance or embarrassment resulting from such disclosure."
According to Masterson, "If the prosecution can go in and show with any kind of
reasonable prospect that there is going to be danger, it can get a protection order. In our
area, many judges are former prosecutors, and they understand well the problems."
40. See M. EASLEY, supra note 18.
41. Id. at 2.
42. In a summary of his interview with Mike Diaz, a detective with the Homocide Division in
Dade County, Easley noted the statement by Diaz that "the name of a witness must be disclosed
prior to trial under their current discovery law and that this contributed heavily to the drug related
murders." Id. at 2.
43. Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1983, at IA, col. 6; id. July 29, 1983, at 1D, col. 3.
44. Raleigh News and Observer, July 30, 1983, at 1A, col. 6.
45. Id., July 29, 1983, at 1D, col. 3.
46. Officer Diaz stated that these murders are difficult to solve because it was very easy
to have Colombians and other Latins to fly in, get off the airplane, go to the victim's
home, do the killing, go back to the airport and leave the country. Under those circum-
stances even if they could determine who did the killing it would not be practical to
attempt to extradite the defendant from Colombia.
M. EASLEY, supra note 18, at 3.
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General Assembly again amended the statute in August 1983. As amended,
section 15A-903(a)(2) requires the prosecutor:
To divulge, in written or recorded form, the substance of any oral
statement relevant to the subject matter of the case made by the de-
fendant, regardless of to whom it is made, within the possession, cus-
tody, or control of the State, the existence of which is known to the
prosecutor or becomes known to him prior to or during the course of
the trial. .... 47
Thus, amended section 15A-903(a)(2) limits the prosecutor's duty to disclose
to defendants, statements "relevant to the subject matter of the case" and elim-
inates the "diligent search" requirement. By more clearly defining this duty,
the August amendment rids the statute of much of the vagueness of the July
amendment, and makes certain that this duty is not as broad as the July
amendment implied.4 8
The August amendment also reduces the prosecutor's paperwork burden.
The statute continues with the limitation that "disclosure of such a statement
is not required if it was made to an informant whose identity is a prosecution
secret and who will not testify for the prosecution, and if the statement is not
exculpatory." 49 This limitation also reduces significantly the paperwork bur-
den since prosecutors need only be concerned with documenting statements
made to witnesses who will testify at trial-a burden that merely is incidental
to normal trial preparation. Moreover, the prosecutor no longer will have to
worry about divulging statements of his informants as long as they do not
testify at trial. This latter aspect should eliminate fears of witness harassment
and reduce any "chilling effect" on witnesses or informants. Furthermore, the
reference in the statute requiring the disclosure of "exculpatory statements"
known to the prosecutor is consonant with the due process requirement that
exculpatory evidence be made available to the defendant.5 0
As a safeguard to the defendant's interests in not being surprised at trial,
the new statute adds: "If disclosure of the substance of defendant's oral state-
ment to an informant whose identity is or was a prosecution secret is withheld,
the informant must not testify for the prosecution at trial."'" This addition
ensures that if a statement is withheld from a defendant because it became
known to the prosecution through a confidential informant, the informant will
not be allowed to testify for the prosecution at trial--even if the informant
47. Act of Aug. 26, 1983 (emphasis added) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b)
(1983)).
48. See supra text accompanying note 21.
49. Act of Aug. 26, 1983 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2)(b) (1983)).
50. The disclosure of known exculpatory evidence that has been "requested" and is "mate-
rial" is mandated by the due process guarantee of a fair trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 105 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady the Court stated:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made avail-
able, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears
heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a pro-
ceeding that does not comport with the standards ofjustice. ...
Id. at 87-88.
51. Act of Aug. 26, 1983.
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later decides to give up his confidential status. Thus, even though the defend-
ant will be deprived of the knowledge that the prosecution is aware of this
statement, the defendant does not need this information for preparing his case.
The prosecutor is prohibited from using this witness at trial.
Finally, the new statute adds the requirement that:
If the statement was made to a person other than a law enforcement
officer and if the statement is then known to the State, the State must
divulge the substance of the statement no later than 12 o'clock noon,
on Wednesday prior to the beginning of the week during which the
case is calendared for trial.52
In so doing, the prosecutor's paperwork burden is eased as he is ensured a
certain amount of time before his duty of disclosure is triggered. More impor-
tantly, it reduces the likelihood of harassment of witnesses whose identity
eventually will become known to the defendant. The prosecutor now can pro-
tect his witnesses until the latest practical date. The significance of the
"Wednesday prior to the beginning of the week" of trial, and the reason that
this is the latest practical date, relates to the statutory deadline for pretrial
motions, which falls on such Wednesdays at five o'clock P.M.5 3 The new stat-
ute sets twelve o'clock as the prosecutor's disclosure deadline to permit the
defense attorney five hours to move for a continuance in light of this new
evidence. 54
Simultaneously with the amendment of this section of the statute, North
Carolina General Statutes Section 15A-908(a) was amended to provide protec-
tion in, as specific examples of what may constitute "good cause" for the issu-
ance of a protective order, situations where "there is a substantial risk to any
person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or unnec-
essary annoyance or embarassment." 5 5 This amendment apparently was an
attempt to add a degree of certainty to the process of obtaining protective or-
ders so that confidential informants can be given guarantees of remaining
anonymous. Such guarantees, it is hoped, will help avoid any "chilling effect"
on informants.
The August amendment is a compromise. On the one hand, it balances
the interests of providing defendants with the broadest possible discovery and
avoiding surprise at trial. On the other, it balances the interest of effecting
economies in the discovery process by limiting the prosecutor's paperwork
burden, and protecting the interests of confidential informants. The compro-
mise is sound. A defendant in North Carolina is in a much better position
than he was prior to 1983. He will be allowed discovery of all statements he
made that became known to the prosecutor through witnesses who will testify
52. Id.
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-952(c) (1983).
54. Act of Aug. 26, 1983. Arguably, five hours is too short a time for this decision to be made
by anyone, except possibly an attorney whose single client is this defendant. Delaying disclosure
to this late moment may be unfair, as there is no guarantee a continuance will be granted, and,
even where one is granted, inconvenience would still result.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908(a) (1983).
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against him at trial. In addition, the defendant's position has been improved
with a minimal effect on the prosecutor's burden and use of confidential
informants.
It can be argued that all of a defendant's known statements should be
discoverable,56 and that the North Carolina General Assembly's decision to
exclude those made to a confidential informant was based on inconclusive
comparisons with a single county in Florida. As long as the protected infor-
mants do not testify at trial, however, it is difficult to argue that excluding
these statements will hurt the defendant in his trial preparation or in determin-
ing whether a guilty plea is advisable. The North Carolina district attorneys'
arguments in favor of protecting the identities of confidential informants,
though weakly supported in evidence, have some logical appeal. A test period
in which the legislature could study the effects of the more liberal discovery
rules would have been worthwhile. This test period would have been espe-
cially appealing in light of the August amendment to the protective order stat-
ute. The safety of confidential informants, however, is a significant concern
and justifies the less expansive new statute.
JONATHAN M. POLK
56. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
[V/ol. 621270
